Rabinovich has an excellent 3rd chapter on the short lived dictatorship of Husni Zaim in Syria who, in an appeal to the Americans, was willing to get rid of his Austrian (read: former Nazi) advisors, establish concentration camps for communists and other undesirables in return for American air bases (and training) in order to counterbalance the Soviet Union. Well written backgrounder on early Arab-Israeli peace negotiations describing the various offers, counter offers, strategic and political concerns, both at the Lausanne Conference and during what passed for "shuttle diplomacy" at the time Drawing on intensive research, he not only alters our understanding of the current conflict, but he holds out hope for a future breakthrough by revealing the real possibilities and serious efforts that almost led to peace in the early years of Israel's existence. Neither a militant Israeli nor a revisionist critic of Jerusalem's policies, he demonstrates that mistakes and preoccupations on the part of each nation led to the current quagmire. Rabinovich has long been one of Israel's leading scholars of Arab history, winning a reputation for incisive, even-handed works. With a keen analytical eye and detailed brushstrokes, Rabinovich paints a vivid portrait of these pivotal rounds of diplomacy from 1949 to 1952, showing how a permanent peace came within reach, only to slip away for years to come. Within Israel, fierce debates raged over how to handle negotiations (echoing clearly in our own time), some favoring a settlement with Amman based on a recognition of Transjordan's annexation of the West Bank, others-like Ben-Gurion-advocating overtures to Egypt, as the region's most integrated and stable Arab state. And farther back loomed the U.S., about to succeed Britain as the dominant Western power in the region. Behind the scenes stood the region's last imperial power, Great Britain, whose manipulations were suspected by all parties even where they did not exist. Egypt approached the armistice talks with its own goals in mind, seeking the southern Negev desert and other gains. Zaim, the book shows, was allied to the U.S. The region's first military dictator, Husni al-Zaim of Syria, offered an intriguing, if illusory, opening, as he sought a permanent settlement with Israel so he could concentrate on internal issues. King Abdallah of Transjordan negotiated with Israel with an eye toward siezing what is now called the West Bank and-ultimately-the Hejaz in the Arabian Peninsula. In 1949, the Arab world was divided as never before-Iraq and Transjordan were at odds with Saudi Arabia and Egypt-and each state wrestled with its own negotations with Israel. In the aftermath of the 1948 war, Rabinovich writes, the seeds of the present turmoil in the Middle East were sown: confused and debated borders, hundreds of thousands of Arab refugees, internal struggles over each government's political agenda. In The Road Not Taken, Itamar Rabinovich mines a wealth of new sources to reconstruct those critical talks, showing how close they came to success, and how their failure laid the grounds for the current impasse. But for a few brief years after Israel's War of Independence, the Jewish and Arab states engaged in direct negotiations that came tantalizingly close to a permanent settlement. No conflict in international politics has seemed more intractable. But always leading on to something better.Īnd if we’re reassured in our decision while telling our stories, all the better.For five decades, the Arab world has technically been in a state of war with Israel-a pattern broken only by Cairo's Camp David accord with Jerusalem. The conditions in which we do this are ever-changing: room size, platforms, moods, competing priorities, staff…Īnd so elements of our narrative change accordingly. In doing so, we capture the imagination and attention of the people we’re trying to reach, whether they’re in a room with us or in front of a screen somewhere. And each of us faces that every day as we choose to create our own narrative or a message for a brand or company.Īs storytellers, we choose which details are essential to include, and which are superfluous to the story. But it’s also about the choice to tell a story in a certain way. So in that respect, yes, it’s about choices. I mean, who’s going to want to read or listen to a poem about a guy who comes to two grassy paths and just picks one at random? Don’t you think it’s reasonable to believe there were embellishments and improvements along Frost’s way?
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